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NONREFOULEMENT UNDER
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE:
HOW U.S. ALLOWANCES FOR DIPLOMATIC
ASSURANCES CONTRAVENE TREATY
OBLIGATIONS AND FEDERAL LAW
“Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right . . . . These
times of increasing terror challenge the world . . . . But we will
not compromise the rule of law or the values and principles that
make us strong. Torture is wrong no matter where it occurs, and
the United States will continue to lead the fight to eliminate it
everywhere.”
-President George W. Bush 1

INTRODUCTION

B

efore the September 11th terrorist attacks on the U.S. and the ensuing “war on terror,” the word “torture” still carried the stigma of
pre-Enlightenment hysteria, from the Spanish Inquisition to witch hunts
in Italy, France, and Germany. 2 The United States, founded on the posttorture, Enlightenment concept of inalienable natural rights, has never
been stained with this medieval blood. 3 Yet, today, the United States
faces intense criticism, both abroad 4 and at home, for its methods of
fighting terrorism. 5 The question of whether preventing terrorist acts justifies torturing suspects to obtain information has become a topic of
1. President’s Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims
of Torture, 2003 WL 21471582 (White House)(June 26, 2005), also available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/45738.htm#annex2.
2. See John H. Langbein, The Legal History of Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION
93 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); RICHARD S. DUNN, THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WARS (15591715 ) 129, 132—133 (2d ed., 1979) (1970).
3. While America experienced its own witch hunts in Salem, in 1692, New England
law followed the Anglo common law judicial system, which, having replaced the ordeal
system of proof with the jury trial, did not investigate under torture. See Langbein, supra
note 2, at 99. But see Jerome H. Skolnick, American Interrogation: From Torture to
Trickery, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 2, at 105 (asserting that torture is, contrary to popular belief, a feature of American heritage, evidenced by lynchings and use of
“the third degree” in police interrogation).
4. See “Court Issues European Arrest Warrants for 22 CIA Agents,” Los Angeles
Times, December 23, 2005; “Europe Fears Linger on US Torture,” CNN.com, December
9, 2005, http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/12/09/rice.europe.ap (last visited
December 24, 2005).
5. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, “Dangerous Territory,” New York Times, December 19,
2005.
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enormous public outrage, controversy, and discourse in the United
States. Convictions (and photos) of American soldiers torturing detainees
at the Abu Ghraib military prison 6 have thrust the American public into a
roiling debate over the role of torture and international law in the U.S.’s
war on terror. 7 The debate has risen to the level of congressional investigations 8 and legislation, 9 fueled by reports of prisoner abuse at Guantanamo 10 and accounts of secret “extraordinary renditions” 11 to countries
6. See Seymour Hersh, “The Gray Zone,” The New Yorker, May 24, 2004; Seymour
Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” The New Yorker, May 10, 2004. See also, “Prisoner
Abuse Scandal: Full Coverage of the Investigations into the Mistreatment of Detainees by
U.S.
Soldiers
in
Iraq
and
Afghanistan,”
Baltimore
Sun,
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/iraq/bal-prisonerabuse,0,382271
.storygallery?coll=bal-iraq-storyutil (last visited April 4, 2007); Edward Alden and
Dmitri Sevastopulo, “One Year On, Public Disquiet on Abu Ghraib Reverberates,” Financial Times, April 27, 2005; “All But One Top Officer Cleared on Abu Ghraib,” International Herald Tribune, April 25, 2005.
7. See, e.g., NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Debating the Efficacy of Torture in Interrogation (PBS television broadcast Dec. 2, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec05/torture_12-02.html).
8. See, e.g., Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Chairman Henry A.
Waxman, 110th Congress, “Investigations, Abu Ghraib Prison Abuses,”
http://oversight.house.gov/investigations.asp?Issue=Abu+Ghraib+Prison+Abuses
(last
visited April 4, 2007); “Abu Ghraib: Congressional Investigation,” SourceWatch, a project
for
the
Center
for
Media
&
Democracy,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Abu_Ghraib:_Congressional_Investigation#
Congressional_Calls_for_Action (last modified June 4, 2005).
9. See Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act, H.R. 952, 109th Cong. (2005) (“Markey
Bill”), reintroduced, H.R. 1352, 110th Cong. (2007); The Convention Against Torture
Implementation Act, S. 654, 109th Cong. (2005)(“Leahy Bill”). The Leahy Bill would
supersede Section 2242 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998,
Pub.L. No. 105-277, §2242, 112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§1231)[hereinafter FARRA] and make written or verbal diplomatic assurances against
torture, infra notes 22 and 23, insufficient to relieve the prohibition against returning a
person to a place where there are substantial grounds to believe that he will be tortured.
The Markey Bill would amend, not supersede, Section 2242 of FARRA, to require an
independent judicial process whereby a person can challenge any diplomatic assurances
against torture, and, specifically in the immigration context, to make the sole reliance on
such assurances an insufficient basis for believing the person would not be tortured if
removed to the country in question.
10. See Dan Eggen and R. Jeffrey Smith, “FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay,” Washington Post, December 21, 2004. See also, Eric Schmitt and
Tim Golden, “Force-Feeding at Guantanamo is Now Acknowledged,” New York Times,
February 22, 2006; “Prisoner Abuse Scandal,” Baltimore Sun, supra note 6.
11. Extraordinary rendition, as defined by a European Parliamentary committee in its
investigation of CIA counterterrorism activities in Europe, is an “extra-judicial practice
which contravenes established international human rights standards and whereby an individual suspected of involvement in terrorism is illegally abducted, arrested and/or trans-
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with documented instances of state torture such as Egypt, Morocco, and
Syria, and secret prisons. 12 The U.S. war on terrorism has also served as
an impetus to tighten immigration laws and to interlock them with antiterrorism measures. 13 Not long after the attacks of September 11th, President George W. Bush issued a statement titled, “Combating Terrorism
through Immigration Policies,” 14 and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service was made part of the newly created Department of Homeland
Security. 15 Still, Congress has recognized that while there may exist an
ferred into the custody of US officials and/or transported to another country for interrogation which, in the majority of cases, involves incommunicado detention and torture.”
European Parliament, Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries
by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention
of Prisoners, ¶36, Doc A6-0020/2007 (January 30, 2007). Or, as one anonymous American official put it, “We don’t kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other
countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them.” Dana Priest and Barton Gellman,
“U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,” Washington Post, December 26, 2002,
A1. See also Guy Dinmore, “US Tries to Assure Allies that Extraordinary Renditions are
Over,” Financial Times, December 27, 2006; Craig Whitlock, “Probe of Detainee Transfers Finds Many CIA Flights,” Washington Post, April 27, 2006, A20.
12. See Jane Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture,” The New Yorker, February 7, 2005. See
also Demetri Sevastopulo, Guy Dinmore, Christopher Condon, “Brussels to Probe
Claims of Secret CIA Jails,” Financial Times, November 3, 2005; Bob Herbert, “Our
Friends, the Torturers,” New York Times, February 18, 2005; “Rice is Challenged in
Europe over Secret Prisons,” New York Times, December 7, 2005.
13. Post September 11th, changes to immigration laws have been proposed and enacted as part of security and anti-terrorism bills. The REAL ID Act not only made
changes to admission procedures at points of entry but also eliminated district courts’
jurisdiction over removable aliens’ habeas claims. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-13, Div. B, §106, 119 Stat. 302 (amending 8 U.S.C. 1252(B)(4))[hereinafter REAL
ID Act]. But see Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 376 F.Supp. 2d 42, 67 n.20 (D.Mass. 2005)
(where alien habeas petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the government’s order
of removal under substantive due process, the federal district court affirmed that
“[d]espite the language of section 1252(g), federal courts retain ‘subject matter jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by aliens facing removal to the extent that those petitions are based on colorable claims . . . that an alien’s statutory or constitutional rights
have been violated’” (internal citation omitted). Most recently, the House of Representatives passed the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, which further amends the immigration regulations. H.R. 4437, 109th Congress, 1st
Session. See also Margaret D. Stock, “United States Immigration Law in a World of Terror,” National Security White Papers, the Federalist Society, 2003, available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/immigration.htm.
14. Presidential Directive on Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies, 37
PUB. PAPERS 44, Nov. 5, 2001), also available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/10/20011030-2.html.
15. See WHITE HOUSE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, (2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/book.pdf.
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important nexus between immigration and terrorism, 16 the government
must still provide aliens with due process and fairness. 17 It has, in addition, along with the President’s Office and the judiciary, affirmed the
United States’ obligation and commitment under domestic and international law to stand against and prohibit torture under any circumstances. 18
Numerous international organizations, human rights groups, and legal
scholars 19 have voiced concern that diplomatic assurances from countries
that an alien will not be tortured do not adequately guarantee the right to
be free from torture. 20 Under current immigration regulations, the U.S.
cannot remove, or deport, an alien to a country where he faces a substan-

16. But see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary: Immigration Relief Under the Convention
Against Torture For Serious Criminals and Human Rights Violators, 108th Congress. 3
(2003) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Ranking Member of the House Subcommittee on the Judiciary), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/88220.pdf [hereinafter Immigration Relief Hearing](“I always remind my colleagues that immigration does
not equate to terrorism”).
17. See War on Terrorism: Immigration Enforcement Since September 11, 2001:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the
Committee on the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Congress (2003), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108th/86954.pdf [hereinafter War on Terrorism Hearing Report].
18. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980)[hereinafter Filartiga I]; Second Periodic Report of the United
States of America to the Committee Against Torture (2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/45738.htm; see also Reuters, “House Passes Torture Ban,
War
Funding,”
Washington
Post.com,
December
19,
2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/19/AR2005121900801
.html.
19. The Secretary General, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc A/60/316 (Aug. 30,
2005); The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions,” 60 The Record 13,
47 n.100 (2005)[hereinafter ABCNY report]; MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RENDITIONS: CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY LAWS
ON TORTURE (2005), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32890.pdf; Human Rights
Watch report, Empty Promises: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture,
Vol.
16,
No.
4D,
April
2004,
also
available
at
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/diplomatic0404.pdf (last visited December 24,
2005)[hereinafter HRW Report].
20. See Breffni O’Rourke, “Rice Defends Terror Practices as Europe Faces Tough
Questions,”
RadioFreeEurope
Radio
Liberty,
December
6,
2005,
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/12/3fc7f75f-e6a8-4fe3-ab7f-833336b06ac2
.html; see also Michael John Garcia, supra note 19.

2007]

NONREFOULEMENT

1231

tial risk of torture. 21 However, if the Secretary of State obtains diplomatic assurances from such a country that the alien will not be tortured
and forwards the assurances to the Attorney General, then the alien may
be removed without further administrative review. 22 In addition, the diplomatic assurances may not be reviewed in federal courts. 23
This note will argue that the U.S.’s current use of diplomatic assurances must—but fails to—comply with Convention Against Torture

21. Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. §208.18 (2005). The
regulations implemented FARRA, supra note 9, congressional legislation enacting CAT.
Section 2242(a) states:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected
to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United
States.
22. Diplomatic Assurances Against Torture Obtained by the Secretary of State, 8
C.F.R. §208.18(c) (2005)[hereinafter Diplomatic Assurances].
(1) The Secretary of State may forward to the Attorney General assurances that
the Secretary has obtained from the government of a specific country that an
alien would not be tortured there if the alien were removed to that country.
(2) If the Secretary of State forwards assurances described in paragraph (c)(1)
of this section to the Attorney General for consideration by the Attorney General or her delegates under this paragraph, the Attorney General shall determine, in consultation with the Secretary of State, whether the assurances are
sufficiently reliable to allow the alien’s removal to that country consistent with
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. The Attorney General’s authority
under this paragraph may be exercised by the Deputy
Attorney General or by the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, but may not be further delegated.
(3) Once assurances are provided under paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the
alien’s claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture shall not be
considered further by an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals,
or an asylum officer.
23. The Attorney General and Secretary of State determine whether diplomatic assurances against torture safeguard removal in compliance with CAT, 8 C.F.R. §§208.17(f),
208.18(c), (e) and such discretion is non-reviewable. Judicial Review of Orders of Removal, 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (“no court shall have jurisdiction to review any other
decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the
authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. . .”).
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(“CAT”) 24 treaty obligations and customary international law. 25 Under
the Charming Betsy doctrine, 26 the Supreme Court has long held that
treaties, like statutes, are the “law of the land,” 27 and that subsequent
laws cannot violate them without express Congressional intent. 28 Congress has not expressly stated any intention to derogate from its nonrefoulement obligations under CAT; 29 in fact, recent bills and congressional hearings reaffirm Congress’s intent to safeguard CAT’s absolute
protection against torture. 30 Therefore, current regulations must be
amended, for the use of non-reviewable and insufficiently reliable diplomatic assurances, whether or not given in good faith, effectively derogates from CAT’s prohibition against torture. 31
24. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
of Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter CAT].
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., §702 (1987).
Customary international law, once established by the practice of states that base that practice upon a sense of legal obligation, also binds those states that do not follow that practice and/or have not directly or tacitly expressed their consent to be bound by it. See, e.g.
the Lotus Case, France v. Turkey, 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (1926)(construing “principles of international law” as “the principles which are in force between all independent
nations.”).
26. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 2 Cranch 64 (1804).
27. Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). See U.S.
CONSTITUTION art. 3 §2.
28. Courts must interpret federal statutes in a way that avoids violating international
law. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (citing Murray v. The Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 2 Cranch 64 (1804) and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-21 (1963)), cited and followed by Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d
815, 829 (9th Cir. 2000).
29. CAT, supra note 24, at art. 3. “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”
30. See, e.g., Markey Bill and Leahy Bill, supra note 9. See also Immigration Relief
Under the Convention Against Torture for Serious Criminals and Human Rights Violators: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Congress (2003), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/88220.pdf.
31. The UN Special Rapporteur Manfred Nowak concluded the following in his 2005
report to the UN General Assembly: “It is the view of the Special Rapporteur that diplomatic assurances are unreliable and ineffective in the protection against torture and illtreatment: such assurances are sought usually from States where the practice of torture is
systematic; post-return monitoring mechanisms have proven to be no guarantee against
torture; diplomatic assurances are not legally binding, therefore they carry no legal effect
and no accountability if breached; and the person whom the assurances aim to protect has
no recourse if the assurances are violated. The Special Rapporteur is therefore of the
opinion that States cannot resort to diplomatic assurances as a safeguard against torture
and ill-treatment where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be
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Part I of this note will set forth the international law instruments prohibiting torture and the return of an individual to a substantial risk of torture. It will describe the U.S.’s obligations under international law and
the various domestic laws it has implemented in order to fulfill these obligations. Part II will analyze these domestic laws and regulations under
the Charming Betsy doctrine, 32 the Administrative Procedure Act, 33 and
constitutional law principles, ultimately concluding that U.S. law does
not implement the U.S.’s international obligations and that they violate
the Separation of Powers doctrine and due process. 34 Part III will argue
for a judicial review mechanism of diplomatic assurances that fairly balances the various competencies and interests of the judiciary and the executive branch. Such a proposal is informed by current state practices
outside the United States.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW PROHIBITING TORTURE
Since World War II, the international community has formally prohibited torture through numerous treaties and declarations, 35 as well as muin danger of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment upon return.” Interim Report, supra note 19. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has held that CAT’s Article
3 prohibition of torture includes the principle of nonrefoulement in Soering v. The United
Kingdom, [1989] Eur. Ct. H.R. 14038/88. The ECHR has also held that even diplomatic
assurances that are given in good faith may be an inadequate guarantee of safety for return to a country where torture is a “recalcitrant and enduring problem.” Chahal v. The
United Kingdom, [1996] Eur. Ct. H.R. 22414/93 ¶105. Even if the U.S. withdrew from
the nonrefoulement provision of CAT, it would still be obligated to prohibit the return to
torture under customary international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
art. 43, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 8 I.L.M. 679. The Vienna Convention’s interpretive authority over treaties has been recognized and followed by the U.S. State Department and several federal appeals courts. See Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention Before the United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281 (1988).
32. Charming Betsy doctrine, supra notes 26 and 28.
33. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551-559, 701-706 (2000)[hereinafter
APA]. The APA ensures that final agency action can be reviewed by the federal courts
when no other remedy is available, 5 U.S.C. §704 (2000), except for several specified
agencies, such as military agencies during wartime and political party agencies. Immigration agencies are not exempt from the APA.
34. Infra Section II(B)(3).
35. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 24; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 21st Sess., 1496th
plen. Mtg. at 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (XXI), at art. 7 (1966) (providing that [n]o
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); Universal Declaration on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316, at art. 5 (1948) (providing that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”).
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nicipal (domestic) constitutions and laws. 36 According to the Restatement 3d of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., the prohibition against
torture is also customary international law. 37 Finally, torture may also be
considered a violation of peremptory international norms (jus cogens), 38
as its prohibition is found in “all comprehensive international instruments:” 39 the Geneva Conventions; 40 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; 41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 42 European Convention on Human Rights; 43 American Convention on Human

36. See, e.g., in the United States, 18 U.S.C. §2340(A); “Torture Victim Protection
Act,” 8 C.F.R. §208.18 [hereinafter TVPA]; FARRA, supra note 9.
37. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25. Regarding torture in particular, “[e]ven persons
who are not entitled to the protections of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (such as some
detainees from third countries) are protected by the “fundamental guarantees” of article
75 of Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions. The United States has long considered article 75 to be part of customary international law (a widely supported state practice
accepted as law). Article 75 prohibits murder, “torture of all kinds, whether physical or
mental,” “corporal punishment,” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, … and any form of indecent assault.” Human Rights
Watch, Summary of International and U.S. Law Prohibiting Torture and Other Illtreatment
of
Persons
in
Custody,
May
24,
2004,
available
at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/24/usint8614.htm.
38. Jus cogens, or a peremptory norm of international law, is “a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 31, at art. 53. See also, Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d
699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992)(“Under international law, . . . official torture violates jus cogens.”); 48 C.J.S. International Law §2 (2005)(“Jus cogens norms are norms of international law that are binding on states, or nations, even if they do not agree to them”).
39. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, at §702, reporter’s note 5.
40. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
41. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 19, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A.
Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810.
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 7.
43. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 3.
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Rights; 44 and the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. 45 Perhaps the most important of the international instruments prohibiting torture, however, CAT permits absolutely no exceptions to the prohibition
on torture, stating that not even war or public emergency can justify torture. 46 Additionally, CAT forbids refoulement—the return, extradition, or
expulsion of a person to another country where “there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.” 47
President Reagan signed CAT on April 18, 1988 on behalf of the
United States, subject to a declaration stating that Articles 1 through 16
were not self-executing 48 and thus required domestic legislation for implementation. The Senate ratified CAT, subject to various declarations
and understandings, 49 on October 21, 1994, and the U.S. became a full
party to the treaty in November 1994. Congress eventually passed the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”) in 1998,

44. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art.
5(2).
45. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened for signature June 27,
1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, art. 5 (1982).
46. CAT, supra note 24, at art. 2(2). “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever,
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” As of April 19, 2007, there
were 74 signatories and 144 parties to CAT. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p.
85, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm. But see James
Park Taylor, Dancing with the Scavenger’s Daughter: Torture, Rendition & the United
States, 30-JUL Mont. Law. 10, 38 (2005)(discussing arguments by Alan Dershowitz in
favor of a judicial process to authorize limited derogation from CAT, found in WHY
TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE
(2002)).
47. CAT, supra note 24, at art. 3.
48. http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/
treaty14.asp; Sen. Exec. Rpt. 101-30, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification,
(1990), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ntquery/z?trtys:100TD00020.
49. The United States ratified CAT subject to the following declarations, reservations,
and understandings: a declaration that CAT Articles 1 through 16 were not self-executing
(and so required domestic legislation for implementation), id. at III.(2); a reservation that
limited Article 16’s binding authority over lesser forms of cruel and unusual punishment
to the prohibitions of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments, id. at I.(2); an opting-out of the arbitration provisions of Article 30, id. at I.(3); an
understanding that acts of torture must be committed by or at the acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity, id. at II.(1)(b); an understanding that
mere noncompliance with applicable legal procedural standards does not automatically
constitute torture, id. at II.(1)(e); an understanding specifying the “more likely than not”
standard to be met in nonrefoulement,” id. at II.(2).
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which implemented CAT’s prohibition against torture 50 and refoulement. 51 While the U.S. had already prohibited refoulement in the context
of refugees and asylum seekers, 52 FARRA broadened the class of protected persons, pursuant to CAT, to include individuals who lack a valid
asylum claim 53 but who nevertheless are “more likely than not” to face a
risk of torture. 54 This class of individuals is not eligible for permanent
status in the United States and may be returned to another country on the
strength of diplomatic assurances. 55

50. As codified in 8 C.F.R. §1208.18, an act of “torture” is defined as “any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person...” Torture “is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment.” The definition is
consistent with Article 1 of CAT, except for the requirement of intentional infliction,
which entered the statute by United States understandings.
51. FARRA, supra note 9, at §2242(a): “It shall be the policy of the United States not
to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in
which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being
subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United
States.
52. Congress acceded to the 1967 United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees in 1968. G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI) (Nov. 18, 1966), U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC] Res. 1186 (XLI) (Dec. 16, 1966). In 1980, in order to bring domestic law into
compliance with the Protocol, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980. Pub.L. No. 96212, 94 Stat. 102. The Act included a nonrefoulement provision, which has since been
slightly modified by the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) and codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act §241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§1231(b)(3)(B).
53. Asylum applicants must prove persecution based on one of five protected
grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion in the country in question. 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(i) (2005).
54. FARRA delegated implementation of the U.S.’s obligations under Article 3 of
CAT to “the appropriate agencies.” Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and
Executive Office for Immigration Review regulations interpreted FARRA’s “substantial
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture” to
require a “more likely than not” burden of proof of the applicant. Regulations Concerning
the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. §208.16(c)(2) (2005).
55. See Immigration Relief Hearing, supra note 16, at 24 (“It is not and has never
been an avenue for permanent residency, the Convention Against Torture relief. Unlike
asylum, individuals granted Convention Against Torture relief have no right to remain
permanently in the U.S. In fact, I would say that deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture is the most precarious and restricted immigration relief under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, but it has saved lives and it has prevented torture”).
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II. DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES UNDER U.S. LAW
Treaties to which the United States has acceded have equal force of
law as federal statutes. 56 In addition, the Supreme Court has long held
that wherever possible, subsequent acts of Congress must be construed as
consistent with treaty obligations. 57 Regulations, which also have the
force of federal law, are constrained by the statutes that authorize their
promulgation, and by the U.S. Constitution. 58
Under a constitutional law analysis, regulations which allow diplomatic assurances to block any further administrative or judicial review of
a CAT claim overreach their implementing statutory authority and are
manifestly contrary to the purpose of FARRA. 59 Also, regulations which
grant such blanket discretionary power to the executive branch violate
the Constitution’s Separation of Powers doctrine and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process. 60
A. Current Immigration Procedure for Aliens Fearing Torture
Under current immigration procedures, individuals fearing torture in
their home countries may apply for withholding or deferral of removal
under CAT. 61 Unlike asylum applicants, CAT claimants are not barred
from relief if they have committed a particularly serious crime or constitute a danger to the community of the United States. 62 However, they are
56. See U.S. CONSTITUTION art. 3 §2; Foster & Elam v. Neilson, supra note 27, at 314.
57. See Charming Betsy doctrine, supra note 28. See also Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102, 120 (1933)(“[a] treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified
by a later statute, unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed”).
58. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
59. Infra Section II(B)(2).
60. Infra Section II(B)(3).
61. Note that withholding and deferral of removal under CAT are separate from withholding and deferral of removal in the traditional asylum context. An application for
withholding or deferral of removal under CAT does not require proof of persecution
based on any one of the five protected grounds; rather, the applicant must show that “it is
more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country
of removal.” 8 C.F.R. §§208.16(c), 208.17. From March 1999 through August 2002, the
Justice Department processed 53,471 applications for CAT relief, of which less than 3%
were granted. Immigration Relief Hearing, supra note 16, at 1, 9.
62. REGINA GERMAIN, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM
LAW AND PROCEDURE 80 (4th ed., 2005) citing 8 U.S.C. §§1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 [hereinafter INA] set forth mandatory bars to the granting of CAT withholding of removal where:
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only eligible for deferral of removal, which can be terminated more easily than withholding of removal. 63
Under immigration regulations, not the statutory language of FARRA
itself, 64 the Secretary of State and Attorney General have, respectively,
the power to seek and validate “diplomatic assurances” against torture
from the country where a CAT applicant fears torture 65 and to thereby
cut short further consideration of the CAT claim in the administrative
channel. In other words, if the Secretary of State obtains reliable assurances and forwards them to the Attorney General, then the alien’s CAT
claim cannot be further considered by any asylum officer, immigration
judge, or the Board of Immigration Appeals. 66 Thus, while an alien can
typically appeal a denial of his application for withholding or deferral of
removal and obtain a de novo hearing with an immigration judge or the
Board of Immigration Appeals, 67 once diplomatic assurances are accepted by the Attorney General, an alien has no further recourse, unless

(i) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an individual because of the individual’s race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion;
(ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the United States;
(iii) there are serious reasons to believe that the alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States before the alien arrived in the United
States; o
(iv) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.
8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B).
63. GERMAIN, supra note 62, at 227. Deferral of removal does not grant an alien permanent legal status, nor does it confer derivative rights upon family members. Furthermore, it only prohibits the alien’s return to the country of risk, not to other non-risk countries. 8 C.F.R. §1208.17 (2005).
64. FARRA itself sets forth strong policy but leaves the details of actual regulations
to “the heads of the appropriate agencies,” supra note 9, at §2242(b). The INS enacted
implementing regulations in March 1999, creating withholding and deferral of removal
and incorporating the Act’s restrictions on judicial review. 8 C.F.R. §§208.16-18.
65. Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 22.
66. 8 C.F.R. §208.18(c)(3).
67. The Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) has
adjudicatory authority over certain removal and detention decisions made by the Department of Homeland Security, the executive agency charged with the daily implementation
and enforcement of immigration regulations. See ABCNY Report, supra note 19, at 47
n.100.
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he can raise a constitutional law issue, or a question of law concerning
his final order for removal. 68
Diplomatic assurances—their negotiation, reliability, sufficiency—are
not subject to judicial review, for the initial determination of reliability or
validity lies wholly in the protected discretion of the Secretary of State
and the Attorney General. 69 The courts have upheld this nonreviewability of diplomatic assurances. 70
Although FARRA seems to achieve its goal of protecting those who
may be ineligible for traditional asylum or withholding but nevertheless
face a substantial risk of torture, its implementing regulations, which allow “diplomatic assurances” to summarily end any alien’s CAT claim,
fatally undermine the statute’s purpose. Furthermore, the nonreviewability of what amounts to a blanket discretionary power of the
executive branch effectively constitutes an agency-created exception to
FARRA. 71 These two effects of current regulations raise important constitutional issues.
68. REAL ID Act, supra note 13. Since President G.W. Bush signed the REAL ID
Act into law on May 11, 2005, the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
have issued opinions adopting the interpretation that the Act granted them jurisdiction
over errors of law in final removal orders, as well as constitutional claims. See, e.g. Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356 (3rd Cir. 2005); Kamara v. Attorney General, 420
F.3d 202 (3rd Cir. 2005); Rodriguez-Castro v. Gonzales, 2005 WL 2417048 (5th Cir.
2005); Baez v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2005 WL 2436835 (5th
Cir. 2005); Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2005); Hamdan v. Gonzales, 2005
U.S. App. LEXIS 22058 (7th Cir. 2005); Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 585 (9th
Cir. 2005); Chacon-Botero v. Attorney General, 2005 WL 2456877 (11th Cir. 2005). Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit made a point of noting in a footnote of its opinion in Malm
v. Gonzales, 2005 WL 2534194, *3 (4th Cir. 2005), a case that ultimately did not require
the court to decide the alien’s due process claim, “[w]e by no means suggest, however,
that the REAL ID Act is constitutional in all of its applications by referring to its enactment in the context of deciding this case.”
69. See Diplomatic Assurances, supra note 22.
70. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3rd Cir. 2003); Soliman v. U.S.,
296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002)(where the Circuit Court noted that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s decision to terminate the petitioner’s deferral of
removal after securing diplomatic assurances against torture); Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert,
218 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000), related proceeding at 379 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated by, rehearing, en banc, granted by 386 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated by 389
F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2004); Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F.Supp. 2d 188 (where the District
Court rejected a Guantanamo Bay detainee’s motion for a preliminary injunction of transfer to foreign countries).
71. Regulations eliminating both administrative and judicial review of certain issues
operate on a much larger scope than a jurisdictional statute, which “usually takes away no
substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.” Landgraf v. Usi
Film Prods., 516 U.S. 244, 258 (1994).

1240

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 32:3

B. Due Process Analysis
The Supreme Court has long held that aliens who have entered the
United States have liberty interests under the U.S. Constitution and are
“persons” 72 protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process, 73 regardless of the legality of their presence in the
country. 74 While circuit courts remain split over whether the U.S. Constitution grants aliens the right to judicial review of removal proceedings,
they nevertheless unanimously hold that aliens must be given fair administrative hearings. 75 Thus, Congress’s plenary power over immigration
72. See Zadyvdas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)(“[T]he Due Process Clause
applies to all “persons” within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence
here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210
(1982)(rejecting the argument that illegal aliens are not entitled to equal protection);
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)(affirming that even unlawful aliens have the
right to due process to protect against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property). See
also Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597 (1953)(regarding illegal aliens,
“[a]lthough Congress may prescribe conditions for his expulsion and deportation, not
even Congress may expel him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard. Indeed, this Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects an alien subject to a final
order of deportation . . . though the nature of that protection may vary depending upon
status and circumstance . . . .”).
73. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212
(1953); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542 (1952); Wong Wing v. United States,163
U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
74. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982).
75. In the past, the circuit courts have split over whether Congressional restrictions on
judicial review of deportation orders of criminals under new legislation (AEDPA and
IIRIRAIRAIA, infra note 144) violated due process. The vast majority of the circuits
held that fair administrative proceedings were sufficient guarantees of due process. See
Ekasinta v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005); Hall v. INS, 167 F.3d 852,
857 (4th Cir. 1999); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996). However, some among
them also noted that their holdings were heavily influenced by the availability to aliens of
habeas review. See, e.g., Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 126 (1st Cir. 1998)( “In every
circuit which has addressed constitutional challenges to this withdrawal of jurisdiction
[IIRIRA], the court found that preclusion of all judicial review would present serious
constitutional questions, and in every case those questions were avoided by noting the
continuing availability of habeas review. Although the cases diverge in their approaches,
they all agree on these two basic points—that Congress can constitutionally withdraw
jurisdiction over such petitions for review under old INA § 106, but that some jurisdiction remains on habeas.”); Mansour v. INS, 123 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 1997)(noting that the
circuit courts have managed to avoid fully addressing the constitutional question of
whether aliens are entitled to judicial review outside administrative hearings because
habeas relief has been assumed). This assumption of the availability of habeas to aliens in
removal proceedings is no longer viable under the recently passed REAL ID Act, for the
Act expressly stripped the lower courts of habeas jurisdiction and have granted the circuit
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law, 76 including its right to restrict judicial review under certain circumstances, 77 is limited by constitutional constraints 78 that are properly addressed by the courts. 79 Similarly, the Executive Branch’s foreign policy
initiatives, administrative enforcement of federal laws, and the formulation of uniform public policy in immigration matters 80 are subject to judicial review when they violate fundamental individual rights. 81 Even
when the nation is at war, for example, and executive powers expand
significantly, the Separation of Powers doctrine preserves the role of the
courts to ensure that power is not unlawfully “condensed” into a single
branch of government. 82
A due process challenge of the use of diplomatic assurances may argue
that immigration regulations’ restrictions on administrative and judicial
review of those assurances violate due process because they violate the
Separation of Powers doctrine. Such a challenge raises the following
questions: (1) whether immigration regulations concerning CAT claims
are subject to judicial review; (2) whether those regulations granting the
Secretary of State and Attorney General non-reviewable discretion to
terminate a CAT claim are a reasonable interpretation of FARRA; and
(3) whether that discretion is constitutional when it eliminates the possicourts jurisdiction over final orders of removal only on constitutional issues and pure
questions of law. The circuit courts now face a new problem: determining whether they
can review factual findings underpinning the administrative decisions on matters of law
as they could under the old habeas provisions.
76. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 695;
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1883).
77. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.
78. Id.; see also art. 3, §2 of U.S. Constitution. There is a current controversy over
whether Article III §2 authorizes Congress not only to establish lower federal courts but
to define courts’ jurisdiction. See Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
nd
AND POLICIES §2.9 at 148 (Aspen Publishers, 2 ed., 2002).
79. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695, citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941-942 (“Congress must choose ‘a constitutionally permissible means of implementing’ that power”).
See also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300 (“…Congress, like this Court, is bound by and
swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume
that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power
constitutionally forbidden it”).
80. See Zadyvdas, 533 U.S. at 700.
81. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940 (“the plenary authority of Congress over
aliens under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, is not open to question, but what is challenged here is
whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that
power”); Filartiga I, supra note 18; Enwonwu v. Chertoff, supra note 13, at 67, n.20
(where district court, in reviewing an order for forced removal of alien applicant to Nigeria, affirmed that his life and liberty interests in being free from torture are constitutionally protected). See also Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1375 (5th Cir. 1987).
82. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
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bility of further administrative review, and is non-reviewable by an Article III court.
1. Jurisdiction over Administrative Acts
The Administrative Procedure Act of 2000 (“APA”) 83 creates a presumption of judicial review of agency regulations 84 under existing subject matter jurisdiction-granting statutes or writs, 85 except in two cases:
when a statute expressly precludes judicial review; and when agency action has been committed to agency discretion by law. 86 This latter exception is extremely narrow; it applies only to instances where the governing
statute offers no meaningful standard or law for the courts against which
to hold regulations. 87
Regulations allowing for diplomatic assurances and precluding judicial
review of them are reviewable under the APA, for they do not fall under
either of the two APA exceptions. First, FARRA expressly permits judi83. APA, 5 U.S.C. §§551-559, 701-706, supra note 33.
84. See Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), overruled on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)(“An ‘agency action’ includes any
‘rule,’ defined by the Administrative Procedure Act as an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy” citing 5 U.S.C. §§551 (4), 551(13)).
85. APA, 5 U.S.C. §703.
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the
absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including
actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction. If no special statutory review proceeding is applicable, the action for judicial review may be
brought against the United States, the agency by its official title, or the appropriate officer. Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial
review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement.
See also Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d at 1015.
86. The APA does not guarantee judicial review of agency final actions under the
following exceptions: when the governing statute expressly precludes judicial review,
APA §701(a)(1); and when agency action has been committed to its discretion by law,
APA §701(a)(2).
87. See Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d at 1013(9th Cir. 2000)(finding that
FARRA set a clear standard of non-discretionary protection against removal where there
is a substantial likelihood of torture). See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830
(1985)(“The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is
applicable in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply.’ S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)”).
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cial review of final orders of removal in both the administrative and Article III courts. 88 Second, while FARRA authorized the appropriate agencies to form implementing regulations, it also established a clear standard
of law that those regulations must meet:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which
there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is
physically present in the United States. 89

That is, immigration authorities have the non-discretionary duty not to
return an alien where he faces a substantial risk of torture. 90 Therefore,
the APA presumption of judicial reviewability of immigration regulations 91 stands, and challenges to diplomatic assurances are judiciable. 92
However, judicial review of executive regulations cannot center on
“policy questions” 93 or foreign relations. 94 For example, where a statute
88. FARRA §2242(d) specifies that judicial review is appropriate under the INA, 8
U.S.C. §1252.
89. FARRA, supra note 9, at §2242(a).
90. Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 218 F.3d at 1014.
91. See Singh v. Moyer, 867 F.2d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 1989)(citing APA, 5 U.S.C.
701(b)(1)(1982)). A new question raised by the enactment of the REAL ID Act is
whether the Act’s prohibition of habeas petitions independent from review of final orders
of removal leaves aliens without a statute to confer subject matter jurisdiction over their
APA claims. The REAL ID Act specifies that nothing in the provision should be construed to deny judicial review of constitutional claims and questions of law of final orders
of removal; therefore, it may be that aliens can claim that the REAL ID Act, or the resulting amended INA itself confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the circuit courts.
92. The Ninth Circuit’s first opinion in Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, supra note 70, a
landmark challenge to diplomatic assurances, supports the position that the Secretary of
State’s discretionary power under FARRA-enacting regulations are in fact reviewable.
While a subsequent, related proceeding overruled that holding, deeming it non-binding
dicta, the circuit court voted to rehear the case en banc. However, that grant was vacated,
as well the court’s second opinion overruling the holding that is relevant here, for mootness when the foreign government requesting Cornejo-Barreto’s extradition withdrew its
request.
93. In Chevron v. Natural Resources, where plaintiffs challenged Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of deference to
the EPA’s interpretation of the key statutory term “source,” because it determined that
plaintiffs brought their challenge in order to wage “a specific policy battle,” better left to
legislators and administrators, rather than to challenge whether the regulations were a
reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory language and implied intent. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 864. See also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228
(1993)(characterizing the “political question doctrine” as partly concerning whether one
political branch of government is constitutionally vested with final authority over a government function).
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lacks clear language on an issue but expresses congressional intent,
courts will defer to a reasonable administrative interpretation, 95 rather
than make a policy determination that is better left to the legislature and
executive branches. 96 Here, while FARRA’s language is quite broad, it is
not ambiguous, and Congress’s intent in passing the law is expressly
stated in the policy provision of FARRA. Therefore, a court reviewing
regulations under FARRA would not have to avoid inappropriate policymaking by deferring to the executive’s interpretation of the statute.
Similarly, while courts show the executive and legislature great deference where foreign relations are involved, 97 such as in extradition decisions 98 and “political questions,” 99 appropriate deference would not bar

94. See, e.g., Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d at 1084 (discussing the “rule of
non-inquiry,” which is premised upon the notion that courts are ill-equipped as institutions, compared to the legislative and executive branches, to judge the workings of other
countries’ judicial systems).
95. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
96. Id. at 864.
97. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)(“because of the changeable and
explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and the fact that the Executive
is immediately privy to information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by,
and acted upon the legislature. . .”); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.Supp.2d 424 (D.
N.J. 1999)(where the district court held the plaintiff’s World War II-related forced labor
claims nonjudiciable political questions and deferred to executive interpretation of the
international treaty). But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). In Hamdi, the
Supreme Court rejected the Government’s suggestion that courts review enemy combatant determinations under a “very deferential ‘some evidence’ standard” because of the
courts’ limited expertise regarding military decision-making). Id. at 598.
98. See, e.g., Cornejo-Barreto, supra note 70.
99. The political question doctrine renders certain issues non-judiciable. Its principles
were first set forth in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803), by Chief Justice Marshall. The doctrine was later expounded in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962),
which traced it to the Constitution’s separation of powers. Also, courts often deem political questions non-justiciable when foreign relations, entrusted by the Constitution to the
President and Congress, are inextricably involved. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217
(1962):
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from
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review of diplomatic assurance regulations. Deference on political questions is subject to the following constraints: 100 first, whether a nonjudiciable political question exists must be decided case-by-case; 101 second, political questions that possibly exceed constitutional authority are
necessarily judiciable; 102 and, third, the political question doctrine does
not prescribe deference in the face of unconstitutional action. 103 While
immigration regulations do represent a unique nexus of domestic and
foreign policies, 104 the mere fact that a CAT-related issue would involve
consideration of foreign nationals and governments does not render the
issue a political question into which the courts should not inquire. 105 Finally, the courts are clearly authorized to construe treaties and to interpret federal legislation. 106 Indeed, in Chevron v. NRDC, the Supreme
Court affirmed that “the judiciary is the final authority on issues of statu-

the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground
of a political question’s presence
followed by, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335
U.S. 160, 168 (1948).
In subsequent cases, the Court has relied primarily on the first two of the Baker criteria
alone, considering the remaining criteria “prudential” factors. Alperin v. Vatican Bank,
410 F.3d 532, 545-546 (citing Made in the USA Foundation v. U.S., 242 F.3d 1300,
1312-19 (11th Cir. 2001)).
100. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211. See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 17 (“This
does not mean that simply because a statute deals with foreign relations, it can grant the
Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice”).
101. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211; Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d at 537.
102. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217 (“The courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona
fide controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional
authority”).
103. Atkins v. U.S., 556 F.2d 1028, 1053, cert denied, 98 S.Ct. 718 (“[T]he rule of
respect is not a prescription for deference in the face of unconstitutional action, which
would be little more than an abdication of judicial responsibility.”).
104. Not only is foreign policy implicated in the government’s decision to ratify international treaties, but it has also determined specific domestic legislation. For example,
Congress has passed legislation granting temporary protected status, which provides
aliens with a temporary stay of removal, as well as work authorization, to aliens from
Burundi, El Salvador, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Somalia, and Sudan. REGINA
GERMAIN, supra note 62, Appendix 7D at 401.
105. See Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1009, n.5 (noting that FARRA “clearly supersedes” the rule of non-inquiry doctrine); see also Mironescu v. Costner, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6622, at *25 (4th Cir. 2007)(holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
review a decision by the Secretary of State that relied on diplomatic assurances to extradite a CAT-protected alien not because the rule of non-inquiry barred judicial review on
habeas, but because the petitioner challenged his extradition, not removal).
106. U.S. Const. art. 3 §2.
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tory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are
contrary to clear congressional intent.” 107
Under Chevron, whenever considering the legality of implementing
regulations under a governing statute, courts are to determine, first,
whether Congress has directly addressed the question at issue, and, second, whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable. 108 If
Congress has not specifically commented on the question, either in the
statute or the legislative history, then courts may rely on the expressed
purpose(s) of the statute, the policy concerns that motivated the enactment, and a parsing of the statutory language and history for any discernible congressional “intent.” 109 Only if the regulations are found to be
an unreasonable interpretation of the statute—that is, “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” 110—should a court substitute
its own construction of the statute. 111
2. Administrative Acts and Regulations Must Not Be Manifestly
Contrary to Congressional Statutes
FARRA and its legislative history 112 are silent on diplomatic assurances or any similar discretionary power to end a CAT application.
Therefore, under the Chevron rule discussed above, INS regulations concerning diplomatic assurances must fall within a permissible construction
of the statute. 113 More specifically, they cannot be “arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.” 114 If the regulations cannot be harmonized with the statutory program, they are considered null. 115

107. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (1984); followed in I.N.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421 (1987)(where the Supreme Court declined to defer to BIA regulations that uniformly applied fear of persecution standard to asylum and withholding of removal claims
despite clear congressional intent behind the two forms of relief called for distinct standards).
108. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
109. See, e.g., id. at 862-863.
110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
111. See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Construction and Application of “Chevron Deference” to Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 25,
§11 (2005).
112. Sen. Exec. Rpt. 101-30, supra note 48.
113. Chevron rule, supra note 107.
114. See Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004)(quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
115. See Rulemaking Defined and Distinguished, 2 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. §2:69, citing
Dixon v. U.S., 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965).
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While the concept of reliable diplomatic assurances may not be manifestly contrary to FARRA, 116 the non-reviewability of such diplomatic
assurances appears to be so, for the Act implicitly guarantees full judicial
review of final orders of removal in its provisions on “policy” and “review and construction.” First, subsection (d) of the Act provides that
there can be no judicial review of the regulations adopted to implement
the Act, claims raised directly under CAT or FARRA, or “any other determination made with respect to the application of the policy set forth,”
except as part of the review of a final order of removal. 117 The very enumeration of what courts cannot review outside the context of a final order of removal states what they can review in a challenge to a final removal order. The phrase “any other determination made with respect to
the application of the policy set forth…” implies a quite broad palette of
issues that are subject to judicial scrutiny, 118 one that would include diplomatic assurances as well. 119
The second area where Congress seems to have expressed the intent to
safeguard judicial review of final orders of removal is to be found in subsection (c)—”exclusion of certain aliens.” This provision orders implementing regulations to exclude from the CAT protection of withholding
of removal any aliens who have persecuted others, been convicted of a
serious crime and who might be considered dangerous to society, been
116. FARRA, supra note 9, at §2242(c), allows the exclusion from CAT protection of
aliens who have persecuted others; have been convicted of serious crime and considered
dangerous; have been convicted of serious nonpolitical crimes outside the U.S., or
threaten national security.
117. FARRA, supra note 9, at §2242(d).
118. Before the 1940s, the Supreme Court sought to balance constitutional concerns
with the rising administrative state by applying what came to be known as the nondelegation doctrine. See FMC v. S.C. State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 773 (2002)(citing
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) for its “nondelegation
doctrine”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). This doctrine forbade
Congress from delegating its essential legislative powers to administrative agencies.
While Congress could leave the task of dealing with the “host of details with which the
national legislature cannot deal directly,” it had to set clear standards and could not entrust policy choices to the agencies. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 421. In 1935, the
Court struck down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States on the strength of the nondelegation doctrine. Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at §3.10, 319-320. These two
cases, and the doctrine itself, have never been directly overruled; however, no subsequent
legislation has ever been struck down since on the basis of nondelegation.
119. Note that FARRA’s only limitation on judicial review in §2242(d) is that it must
be of a final order of removal. It mentions no specific limitation of judicial review over
certain parts of that order, such as administrative decisions or exercises of discretion; it
simply covers “claims raised under the Convention or this section, or any other determination made with respect to the application of the policy set forth…”
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convicted of a serious nonpolitical crime outside the U.S., or constitute a
danger to national security. 120 Notably, the provision still requires the
exclusion to be consistent with CAT, as ratified by the U.S., “to the
maximum extent,” 121 and indeed such excluded aliens are not barred
from being granted deferral of removal. 122 The U.S. has made no reservation or declaration expressing, or implying, the intent to cut short or qualify the usual administrative hearing process, or to deny federal court review. 123 In light of FARRA’s stated purpose of implementing CAT, 124
these provisions together express a clear congressional intent to guarantee CAT claimants judicial review of final orders of removal and, impliedly, any determination that might result in non-compliance with CAT.
Therefore, INS regulations which deny such review run manifestly contrary to FARRA, and constitute an unreasonable statutory construction.
3. The Separation of Powers Doctrine and Due Process Protection
Current INS regulations implementing FARRA also raise serious constitutional questions concerning separation of powers and due process,
and therefore merit close scrutiny by the courts. 125 The regulations state
that “once assurances are provided . . . . the alien’s claim for protection
under the Convention Against Torture shall not be considered further by
an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or an asylum
officer.” 126 This provision replaces the administrative hearing process

120. The exclusion in FARRA §2242(c) is defined by §241(b)(3)(B) of the INA, supra
note 62.
121. FARRA §2242(c).
122. 8 C.F.R. §208.17
123. See Senate Exec. Rpt. 101-30, supra note 48. While the Senate Report included a
comment that administrative authorities’ determinations would not be subject to judicial
review in federal courts because the Convention was not self-executing, id. at 17-18, the
enactment of FARRA implemented the Convention and did not carve out such an exception to judicial review.
124. Indeed, FARRA’s language mimics CAT in its definitions of key terms and policy statement. Compare CAT art. 3 (“No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”) with FARRA §2242(a) (“POLICY –
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the
involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of
whether the person is physically present in the United States”).
125. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. See also Enwonwu v. Chertoff, 367 F.Supp. 2d at 67,
n.20 (stating that removal aliens have a liberty interest in being free from torture).
126. 8 C.F.R. §208.18(c)(3).
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that is an alien’s minimum due process right, 127 giving the Secretary of
State and Attorney General extremely broad discretion to effectively return an alien to a substantial risk of torture. Furthermore, the regulations
state that the Attorney General’s use of discretion, or “any administrative
decision,” cannot be reviewed by the appellate courts. 128 Such deprivation of judicial review surpasses FARRA’s limitation of judicial review
to final orders of removal, and excessively blocks the courts from carrying out their constitutional duty to protect individuals’ due process
rights—even when the individuals are excludable aliens who are physically in the United States. 129
Consider the following hypothetical examples:
i. Alien X claims persecution based on membership in a social group—
former informants in the Colombian drug trade—as well as fear of torture if he were sent back to Colombia. He asks for a granting of asylum
or CAT protection. If the immigration officer denies his asylum claim
because he doesn’t believe that former drug informants are a valid social
group under asylum law, then Alien X will be sent to an immigration
judge for consideration of his CAT claim. If the immigration judge believes that Colombia might indeed practice torture generally, but that the
evidence fails to show that Alien X, specifically, would be “more likely
than not” to face torture if returned to Colombia, then Alien X will be
ordered removed. At this point, Alien X may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals for a final review.
However, if the Secretary of State seeks and obtains diplomatic assurances, then the Attorney General will consult with the Secretary of State
to decide whether these are sufficiently reliable 130 to accept. If the Attorney General accepts the assurances, Alien X will no longer be able to
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, where he could have
claimed errors of fact or law. 131 Instead, he will only be able to appeal on
questions of law or a constitutional claim to the appropriate circuit court,
which will be limited to reviewing the established administrative record. 132 The circuit court will review the immigration judge’s factual
findings for substantial evidence, and any statutory interpretations de
127. See supra note 75. See also War on Terrorism Hearing Report, supra note 17.
128. 8 CFR §208.18(e). But see FARRA §2242(d)(which does not mention any restriction or prohibition of judicial review of administrative orders or decisions).
129. See supra note 76.
130. 8 CFR §208.18(c)(2).
131. See Germain, supra note 62, at 186, 188.
132. 8 U.S.C.A. §1252(b)(4)(A)(“the court of appeals shall decide the petition only on
the administrative record on which the order of removal is based”); see also Grass v.
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2005).
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novo. 133 Decisions by the Attorney General are not reviewable under current regulations. 134
ii. Alien Y is barred from applying for asylum relief because he was a
member of a rebel militia in Chechnya, a breakaway province in Russia.
He applies for protection under CAT, though, because he fears torture if
he is returned to Russia. Suppose that the immigration judge finds that
Alien Y would in fact “more likely than not” face torture in Russia and
grants him deferral of removal under CAT. If the Secretary of State were
to seek and obtain diplomatic assurances from Russia that Alien Y would
not be tortured there, the Attorney General could then terminate Alien
Y’s deferral of removal. This would constitute a final order of removal,
which Alien Y could appeal in a circuit court on the basis of a constitutional claim of a due process violation. 135
In these scenarios, the Attorney General has the discretionary power to
deny what might be appropriate relief or to revoke properly granted relief; 136 however, this kind of discretion to terminate CAT claims has not
been authorized directly by statute, unlike that for granting asylum, 137
and appears to be contrary to the agency’s own history. Congress has
given the Attorney General broad positive discretion to admit aliens
through the granting of asylum. 138 In addition, Congress has given the
Attorney General power to admit aliens who are otherwise excludable,
such as those previously convicted of crimes involving “moral turpitude”
133. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); Celaj v. Gonzales, 138 Fed.
Appx. 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2005); Sarr v. Gonzales, 127 Fed. Appx. 815, 816 (6th Cir.
2005); El Himri v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2004).
134. See supra note 23.
135. See Utoh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 192 Fed. Appx. 928, 932 (11th Cir.) (holding that
although the circuit courts cannot review discretionary decisions by the Attorney General,
they still retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law).
136. Realistically, these kinds of discretionary decisions are often informed by policy
considerations. In the first scenario, for example, the Attorney General and Secretary of
State might want to guarantee some measure of protection for aliens who have helped
U.S. law enforcement in the war on drugs or, conversely, to expel as many drug-dealing
illegal aliens as possible. In the second scenario, the Executive may not want to welcome
foreign rebels and possible Islamic terrorists. While acknowledging these political considerations, these do not render a challenge to the Attorney General’s power to make such
discretionary decisions non-judiciable. (If the question before us was merely to challenge
an unpopular exercise of discretion, that might be non-judiciable.)
137. INA §208(b). See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423, 428 (1987).
This discretion is non-reviewable unless manifestly contrary to law and abuse of discretion. 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(D). The Supreme Court has interpreted this standard to mean
that a denial of discretionary relief is to be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
138. INA at §1158(b).
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or narcotics, or to cancel removal of inadmissible or removable aliens. 139
In contrast, the Attorney General’s discretionary power over CAT claims
derives only from regulations, not statute. This newer, broader interpretation of the term “discretion” would not necessarily be impermissible 140 if
it was part of a reasonable interpretation of the governing statute. 141
However, for reasons discussed above, 142 such an interpretation is not
reasonable under FARRA, because CAT protection is not discretionary
relief. Therefore, the Attorney General’s discretionary power to terminate CAT claims is doubtful, and the courts should be able to review all
underlying determinations in the denial of a CAT claim. 143
Up until recently, aliens whose challenges to denials of discretionary
relief such as asylum were rejected by the Board of Immigration Appeals—either in the form of a denial to hear the appeal, or a ruling which
upheld the immigration judge’s decision—could still bring a habeas suit
in the federal courts. While statutes and regulations have periodically
limited aliens’ rights to judicial review, the Supreme Court has, nevertheless upheld aliens’ rights to federal habeas review. In INS v. Saint Cyr,
the Supreme Court held that legislation that stripped courts of judicial
review over petitions by aliens who had been classified as aggravated
felons, 144 did not deprive them of habeas jurisdiction, because there was
no such clear congressional intent to be found either in the statute or its
history. 145 In so deciding, the Court relied on the “plain statement rule,”
139. See INS v. Saint Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293-297.
140. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-864. (“The fact that the agency has from time to
time changes its interpretation of the term ‘source’ does not, as respondents argue, lead us
to conclude that no deference should be accorded the agency’s interpretation of the statute. An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the
agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis”).
141. Id. at 866.
142. Supra Section II(B)(2).
143. See Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 416, 425 (3rd Cir. 1996) (“While the asylum claim
is within the discretion of the Attorney General, withholding of deportation shall be
granted if the alien satisfies the relevant standards. 8 U.S.C. §1253(h)(1)”).
144. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996)[hereinafter AEDPA]; Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)[hereinafter IIRIRA]. AEDPA
added a new provision to immigration laws, which stripped courts of judicial review over
any final deportation orders based on the alien’s having committed one of the laws’
specified crimes. AEDPA §440(a), 110 Stat. at 1276. Passed a few months later, IIRIRA
similarly stripped courts of appellate jurisdiction over final orders of removal based on an
alien’s prior commission of certain criminal offenses. IIRIRA §306(a), (codified at INA
§242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(C)).
145. INS v. Saint Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
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which requires Congress to unambiguously state any intention to invoke
extraordinary constitutional powers—such as Congress’s ability to
eliminate judicial review for a certain class—or to eliminate important
constitutional protections like due process. 146 The rule is rooted in the
strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative regulations 147 and Article III of the U.S. Constitution. In addition to the plain
statement rule, the Court adhered to the “constitutional avoidance” principle, 148 which requires that, between a statutory interpretation which
raises serious constitutional problems and a fairly possible alternative
one, the courts must choose the latter.
Most circuit courts have followed the reasoning in Saint Cyr in holding
that FARRA does not revoke habeas jurisdiction over CAT claims. 149
Congress expressly stripped courts of jurisdiction to review regulations
implementing the Act, any decisions made in applying it, and any private
CAT-related claim in a suit brought under FARRA—except in the context of a final removal order—but it did not expressly strip any court of
habeas jurisdiction, nor did it prohibit all judicial review of regulations
made pursuant to the Act. 150 FARRA simply stated that judicial review
could take place only after administrative hearings had been exhausted.
151

Since Saint Cyr, however, Congress has passed additional legislation
that yet again raises separation of powers issues. 152 The REAL ID Act of
146. Id. at 289, 298 (citing Ex Parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 102 (1869)(“We are not at
liberty to except from [habeas corpus jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by
law”)).
147. See APA, supra note 33. The APA ensures that final agency action can be reviewed by the federal courts when no other remedy is available, 5 U.S.C. §704 (2000),
except for several specified agencies, such as military agencies during wartime and political party agencies. 5 U.S.C. §701(b)(1). Immigration agencies are not exempt from the
APA. Id.
148. INS v. Saint Cyr, 533 U.S. 289; followed by Ogbudimpka v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d
207, 214 (3rd Cir. 2003).
149. See, e.g., Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 201 (1st Cir. 2003); Singh v.
Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 2003); Ogbudimpka v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d at 213214; Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1182 (11th Cir. 2004).
150. FARRA §2242(d).
151. See id.
152. Real ID Act of 2005, supra note 13, at §106(a)(4)(“Notwithstanding any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United
States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such
title, a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with
this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or
claim under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, except as provided in subsection (e)”).
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2005 strips district courts of habeas jurisdiction over final orders of removal, and directs all habeas-like challenges to circuit courts instead. 153
The circuit courts are limited to deciding questions of law and constitutional claims and remain, as under pre-REAL ID amendments, prohibited
from examining anything other than the administrative record supporting
the appealed decision and from reviewing underlying factual findings
unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” 154 However, REAL ID expressly states that nothing in the
Act should be construed to deny the circuit courts of the authority to review questions of law and constitution claims. 155
Subsequent to the passage of the REAL ID Act, the circuit courts have
split over whether the Act would prohibit courts from examining factual
findings in the administrative record in deciding issues of law. The Act’s
provision that limitations on judicial review are not to be construed “as
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law” may
seem to imply that circuit courts may review factual findings that underlie legal determinations. 156 If so, then the appellate courts may review
whether determinations of the reliability of diplomatic assurances are
supported by the evidence. However, the administrative record of a final
order of removal is often silent on the reliability of forwarded diplomatic
assurances, because the Attorney General’s consideration of them with
the Secretary of State is not part of the administrative record. Furthermore, even if they were part of the record, such determinations would be
non-reviewable, for current regulations preclude any judicial review of
the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions or actions, except a granting of asylum. 157 Thus, INS regulations restricting the circuit courts to

153. Id.
154. Scope and Standard of Review, 8 U.S.C.A. §1252(b)(4)(A),(B).
155. Judicial Review of Certain Legal Claims, Real ID Act, supra note 13, at
§106(a)(1)(A)(iii), amending 8 U.S.C. §1252 by adding a new provision, §1252(a)(2)(D):
“Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of this Act (other than this
section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”
156. This would ensure conformity with the Supreme Court’s holding in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 937-39 that the courts may review a final order of removal and “all
matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent.”
157. Courts do not have jurisdiction to review “any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified
under this title [8 U.S.C.S. §§1151 et seq.] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General
of the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section
208(a) [8 U.S.C.S. §1158(a).” 8 U.S.C.S. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The exception to the general
rule of non-reviewability, the Attorney General’s decisions to grant asylum may be re-
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the administrative record on which the removal order is based may conflict with REAL ID’s intent to safeguard judicial review of constitutional
claims and questions of law.
III. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS TO AVOID CONSTITUTIONAL INVALIDATION
While the government may legally infringe upon individual rights in
certain circumstances, 158 the courts will, wherever possible, construe and
even limit a statute in such a way as to avoid ruling on its constitutionality. 159 In keeping with this “constitutional avoidance” principle 160 and the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Zadvydas v. Davis, 161 a constitutional challenge of the Attorney General’s discretion over diplomatic assurances
and CAT claims would likely trigger a statutory construction analysis of
FARRA. Such an analysis would decide whether immigration regulations’ interpretation of FARRA raised serious constitutional issues and
whether a possible alternate interpretation could be upheld.
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court faced the decision of whether aliens
who had been found removable could be held in detention indefinitely or
only for a “period reasonably necessary to secure the alien’s removal.” 162 The statute itself specified only that an alien who was ordered
removed and “determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to

viewed under an abuse of discretion or manifest contrariness to the law standard. 8
U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(D).
158. The Supreme Court has long held that the government may infringe fundamental
rights, including due process, under certain conditions. However, government actions will
not go completely unchecked: depending on the government interest that motivates the
challenged government action or program, the courts will apply rational, intermediate, or
strict scrutiny. Government action that discriminates against aliens generally merits strict
scrutiny; in other words, the government must demonstrate an important government
interest, and its actions must be narrowly tailored to serving that interest. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367 (1971). However, rational scrutiny will apply in several
exceptions, such as classifications setting aliens apart in self-government situations and
challenges to federal immigration law that has been passed by Congress. In other words,
states need only prove that the action has a rational relationship to a valid state interest.
159. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)(“When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided”), quoted in Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 689.
160. Id.
161. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678.
162. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 682 [italics in original].
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[certain] terms of supervision.” 163 The Court ultimately ruled that a “reasonable time” limitation applied, to be reviewable by the courts, because
the government’s construction of the statute allowing indefinite detention, and promulgated in immigration regulations, would raise serious
constitutional issues. 164 Specifically, given the fundamental liberty interest in avoiding indefinite detention, administrative proceedings that
lacked “significant later judicial review” 165 for determining whether an
alien was dangerous were deemed inadequate due process. 166 In the
Court’s words, “the serious constitutional problem arising out of a statute
that, in these circumstances, permits an indefinite, perhaps permanent
deprivation of human liberty without any such protection is obvious.” 167
Thus, in keeping with its “constitutional avoidance” principle, 168 the
Court decided the issue of post-removal detention without ruling on the
validity of the statute itself.
A. Proposal
If Alien Y, supra, were to challenge the Attorney General’s power to
terminate his CAT claim and protection through diplomatic assurances,
he could claim that the government’s interpretation of FARRA violates
his due process right to liberty from torture by granting the Attorney
General improper discretion and without valid reason. While the government may point out that FARRA gives “the heads of the appropriate
agencies” the task of formulating regulations “to implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the United Nations Conven163. Id. citing 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6)(1994 ed., Supp. V).
164. Id. at 690—691.The Supreme Court applied a rational basis standard of review in
finding that the government’s regulatory goal of “ensuring the appearance of aliens at
future immigration proceedings” was “weak or nonexistent where removal seems a remote possibility at best,” and that its second goal of “[p]reventing danger to the community” was unrelated to an alien’s removable status when there was no accompanying special circumstance like mental illness or proven dangerousness. The Court also found that
the administrative hearing process, which required the alien to prove that he was not dangerous, was inadequate protection of removable aliens’ fundamental liberty rights.
165. Id. at 692.
166. Id. (“This Court has suggested, however, that the Constitution may well preclude
granting ‘an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental rights.’”) (“The Constitution demands greater procedural protection even for property”).
167. Id. at 692 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 688, citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, (1932); United States v. XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78; United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401
(1916). Comparing to Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998)
(“construction of statute that avoids invalidation best reflects congressional will”).
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tion Against Torture,” 169 Article 3 contains no exceptions or overriding
state interests to the prohibition of nonrefoulement: “No State Party shall
expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.” 170 Also, Article 3 should not be interpreted or
implemented in a way that contravenes other Articles in the Convention
that the U.S. has ratified without objection. 171 For example, no government interest could justify expelling even suspected terrorists to a country where they would be tortured, for that would violate Article 2(2),
which states that “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” 172
Even if the government successfully established a valid state interest, it
would still have to prove that its process was reasonably necessary to
promoting that interest, 173 fell reasonably within the statute’s meaning, 174
and included adequate procedural safeguards of Alien Y’s liberty interest. 175 Failing that, as the Supreme Court ruled in both Zadvydas and in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the courts may impose judicial limitations on the
government’s statutory interpretation when necessary to preserve “the
proper constitutional balance.” 176 While the legislative and executive
branches are constitutionally entrusted with power over war, foreign relations, and immigration policy, that power is “subject to important constitutional limitations.” 177 In cases concerning the indefinite detention of
“enemy combatants” at Guantanamo and other U.S. military facilities,
the Supreme Court has required the government to provide accused combatants a quasi-judicial forum where they can contest their enemy combatant status. 178
169. FARRA §2242(b).
170. CAT art. 3, supra note 24. Although Article 3(2) states that “for the purpose of
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into
account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State
concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights,”
this provision does not amount to a loophole for government policy to override individual
protection.
171. Vienna Convention, supra note 31, at art. 31.
172. CAT, supra note 24, at art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
173. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
174. See id.at 699-700.
175. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004); Zadvydas, 542 U.S. at 689.
176. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 533—534.
177. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 542 U.S. at 695, citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941942.
178. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 533—534.
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In the case of the Attorney General’s broad discretion over diplomatic
assurances and CAT claims, the courts could require the addition of such
procedural safeguards as appellate review of the reliability of accepted
diplomatic assurances: such review could be conducted in camera in order to ensure confidentiality, 179 and the government could benefit from a
presumption of reliability, rebuttable by evidence presented by CAT
claimants. Judicial review might in fact indirectly aid the negotiation of
reliable assurances, as emerging standards may serve as an effective
baseline and notice. In fashioning such limitations, the courts may find
state practices abroad useful reference points.
B. Models of Judicial Review of Diplomatic Assurances Outside the U.S.
Numerous courts abroad have affirmed their role in reviewing diplomatic assurances and have demonstrated reluctance to defer absolutely to
an executive branch. 180 In the United Kingdom, the High Court of Justice
Queens Bench Division ruled in Youssef v. The Home Office 181 that while
the court “should make allowance for the way that government functions
and be slow to second-guess the Executive’s assessment of diplomatic
negotiations,” 182 it maintains judicial review over such assessments. 183

179. In Mironescu v. Costner, regarding the Government’s concerns about the risk that
judicial review of diplomatic assurances would pose to confidentiality and “sensitive
communications” between the Executive branch and foreign governments, the Fourth
Circuit found “no reason to doubt that district courts can adequately protect the confidentiality of such communications by considering them in camera…” Mironescu v. Costner,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS at *27.
180. See Youssef v. the Home Office, 2004 WL 1640250, ¶63 (QBD)(2004); Agiza v.
Sweden, Judgments Comm. Against Torture, 34th session, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005);
Suresh v. Canada, 2002 SCC 1, File No. 27790, 2002 CarswellNat 7, also available at
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/2002/vol1/html/
2002scr1_0003.html.
These courts have required the executive to secure agreements regarding systematic
monitoring of the removed alien’s custody and treatment by the removing state, or independent NGO monitoring.
181. See Youssef v. the Home Office, 2004 WL 1640250.
182. Id. at ¶63.
183. It is important to note that the government did not claim that the courts should
play no role in deciding whether diplomatic assurances are sufficient. In fact, the Home
Secretary and Her Majesty’s Ambassador cited judicial standards to foreign authorities,
as well as the UK Prime Minister, for what could be considered minimum reliable assurances in their negotiations. Id. at ¶21 (“The Ambassador re-emphasized to Mr. Al Baz
that even if agreement could be reached on a set of assurances, the English courts might
not accept them”). See also ¶23.
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The court in Youssef rejected the government’s argument that the High
Court should follow the Wednesbury standard of review, 184 under which
the courts only review the exercise of administrative discretion for unreasonableness. 185 Instead, the court held that, absent compelling reasons
against it, the individual’s liberty interest at stake warranted full judicial
review. 186 In fact, the court examined Home Office, Embassy, and the
Office of the Prime Minister correspondence and records in determining
whether the government unlawfully detained the petitioner alien where
government negotiations with Egypt for diplomatic assurances against
torture were drawn-out and ultimately unsuccessful and not relied
upon. 187 As a result, the High Court found that Egypt’s lack of cooperation on the torture prohibition—namely, its assertions that national sovereignty disallowed UK monitors, and that Egypt’s domestic prohibition
on torture was sufficient assurance—ultimately failed to meet the Home
Office’s requisite level of minimum assurances, which were “those that
the Home Office had been advised a UK court would expect if a case for
deportation were to be reasonably argued.” 188
Since Youssef, the Wednesbury standard of reasonableness has been
held to violate a claimant’s right to an effective remedy under the European Convention of Human Rights. In R. (Daly) v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, 189 the House of Lords recognized that proportionality was the appropriate standard to apply where [C]onvention rights are
at stake. 190 The Daly judgment relied heavily on the recent finding by the
European Court of Human Rights in Smith v. U.K. that the Wednesbury
184. Id. at ¶62.
185. Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 A.J.I.L. 128, n.16.
186. Youssef v. The Home Office, 2004 WL 1640250 at ¶62. The court added that, even
under the argued-for Wednesbury standard of reasonableness, the government still would
have failed to comply with the prohibition against torture: “[T]he Home Secretary’s view
that there remained after 25 June 1999 a real prospect of being able to remove Mr.
Youssef in compliance with Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights was
a view that was beyond the range of responses of a reasonable Secretary of State.” Id. at
¶80.
187. Id. at ¶¶72-81.
188. Id. at ¶¶14, 27. Pre-Smith v. U.K.,[1999] Eur. Ct. H.R. 33985/96, a deportation
claim such as Youssef’s would have had to meet the Wednesbury standard, whereby government action only needed to meet a reasonable standard to justify an infringement of an
individual’s fundamental right under the European Convention of Human Rights.
189. Regina (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2001] 2 A.C. 532
(HL).
190. Id. at 546. See also Nicholas Bamforth, Understanding the Impact and Status of
the Human Rights Act 1998 within English Law, at vi (Global Law Working Paper,
10/2004),
available
at
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/workingpapers/documents/
GLWP1004Bamforth_000.pdf.
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standard of review inadequately protected individuals’ rights to effective
remedy under the Convention, suggesting that Smith “marked the ‘quietus’ of the view that proportionality and Wednesbury review in a human
rights context were ‘substantially the same.’” 191 Under the proportionality standard, courts may review not only the reasonableness of the executive branch’s assessment of diplomatic assurances, but balance competing factors of deference to the executive branch, legislative authority, and
the individual’s fundamental rights. 192
In a Canadian case, Suresh v. Canada, 193 the Supreme Court of Canada
used what can be thought of as a “balance of convenience” standard—
similar to the proportionality standard set out by the U.K. courts and the
European Court of Human Rights—in reviewing the government’s procedure of acquiring and guaranteeing the reliability of diplomatic assurances in a Sri Lankan refugee’s application for a stay of removal. 194 In
Suresh, the court held that “the [CAT] phrase ‘substantial grounds’ raises
a duty to afford an opportunity to demonstrate and defend those
grounds.” 195 Therefore, “where the Minister is relying on written assurances from a foreign government that a person would not be tortured, the
refugee must be given an opportunity to present evidence and make
submissions as to the value of such assurances.” 196
Under current immigration regulations in the United States, once diplomatic assurances are forwarded to the Attorney General, they are determinative and beyond the reach of judicial review of both administrative 197 and federal courts. 198 Although regulations preclude U.S. courts
from reviewing diplomatic assurances, the courts may very well interpret
those regulations to be constitutional only if they allow a judicial review
mechanism: if so, these two international cases discussed above may
provide useful models of how courts may uphold the customary law prohibition on torture.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Regina v. Secretary of State, supra note 189, at 549.
Id. at 547.
Suresh v. Canada, supra note 180.
Id.
Id. at ¶119.
Id. at ¶123.
§208.18(c)(3)
Diplomatic Assurances, supra notes 22 and 23.
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IV. CONCLUSION
There unfortunately remain a number of countries that still employ torture on a widespread or systematic basis, most often in secrecy, 199 sometimes while paying lip-service abroad, and always in violation of international law. 200 This has led some commentators to question the force and
role of international law against human rights violations such as torture,
as promulgated by international institutions such as the United Nations
, 201 or through customary international law. 202 The courts have emphatically affirmed the force of the international prohibition against torture
and rejected inconsistency of rhetoric and action as a basis for dismissing
torture claims: as articulated in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, “where a nation’s
pronouncements form part of the consensus establishing an international
law . . . it does not lie in the mouth of a citizen of that nation, though it
professes one thing and does another, to claim that his country did not
mean what it said . . . If there be hypocrisy, we can only say with La
Rochefoucauld that ‘hypocrisy is the homage which vice pays to virtue.’” 203 Nor must the gap between a state’s public profession of a universal norm, such as the prohibition of torture, and its internal laws and
remedies frustrate efforts to fashion a remedy that vindicates the “repugnance of international wrongs” 204 and furthers “the true progress that has
been made.” 205
Where domestic institutions exist to further compliance with the international prohibition against torture, strengthening such institutions can

199. Many countries that are known to torture routinely deny that they do so. See
HRW Report, supra note 19, at 4. Also, it is often difficult to ascertain the truth: as a rule,
torture is conducted in secret, and prison personnel, ranging from guards to doctors, are
often complicit in using sophisticated techniques to leave few external marks on the
body. Id.
200. Countries that have been criticized by the U.S. State Department in its most recent
Human Rights Report for continuing to employ torture include: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. 28 U.S. STATE DEPT. COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2004.
201. See Peter J. Spiro, “The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its
False Prophets,” FOREIGN AFF. 9, 12 (November/December 2000). See also, Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, “Commentary: Where’s the Old Bolton When We Need Him?” Los
Angeles
Times,
April
19,
2005,
also
available
at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/posner-bolton.html.
202. See Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, “Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law,” 40 VA. J. INT’L. L. 639,
672 (2000).
203. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.Supp. 860, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) [Filartiga II].
204. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F.Supp.2d at 417.
205. Filartiga I, 630 F.2d at 890.
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have a “profound impact” on the international ban against torture. 206 The
U.S. has these means: a statute criminalizing torture and allowing for the
prosecution of alien torturers upon their presence in the U.S., 207 as well
as two civil remedies which similarly allow for a torturer to be brought to
justice, even if the torture took place entirely abroad. 208 The United
States can do more than provide remedies for torture that has already
been suffered, however: it has the structural capability to further prevent
torture with impunity by ensuring that no individual with a valid claim of
fear of torture is sent to face that fear on the strength of mere promises.
Meaningful judicial review of diplomatic assurances can be formulated
and carried out in a manner that both respects and strengthens the roles
of the separate branches of government, allowing the U.S. not only to
fulfill its duties under international law, but to reaffirm its founding principles of protecting and promoting the fundamental rights of the individual.
Jane C. Kim *

206. See Oona Hathaway, “The Promise and Limits of the International Law of Torture,” TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 2, at 209.
207. 18 U.S.C.S. §2340A (2005)(creating criminal right of action in connection with
U.S. accession to CAT).
208. TVPA, supra note 36, at §2; Alien Tort Claims Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§9, 1 Stat. 73, 77, codified at 28 USCS §1350 (2005).
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